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THE RIGHTS OF A WITNESS
BEFORE THE GRAND JURY
The grand jury system has been the subject of recent discussion, par-
ticularly in regard to the potential for prosecutorial abuse.' This com-
ment will examine the rights of witnesses who appear before the grand
jury and concentrate on the applicability of the sixth amendment right
to counsel, the search and seizure provision of the fourth amendment,
and the provision for due process and the privilege against self-
incrimination contained in the fifth amendment. A focus upon this as-
pect of the grand jury will provide a perspective of the potential for
misuse of this legal institution.
Across the country grand juries differ in the means of their establish-
ment, in their size, and in the instances in which an indictment by the
grand jury is required. 2 Grand juries may be of two types: an indicting
grand jury which generally operates with impetus from the prosecutor to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause for an accused to stand trial, or an investigative grand
jury which is convened with the authority to investigate wrongdoing but
which has no particular person or criminal charge in mind and con-
cludes with a "presentment" rather than an indictment. 3 The focus of
this comment will be on the indicting grand jury.
An understanding of the modern grand jury necessitates a look at the
origins of this institution. The grand jury originated at the Assize of
Clarendon in 1166, in which Henry II provided that "twelve knights or
twelve good and lawful men [shall] disclose under oath the names of
those in the community believed guilty of criminal offenses." 4 Initially
people in England feared the grand jury 5 because it was thought to be
merely a tool of the state. The concept of the grand jury as a protective
barrier between the state and the individual arose from a grand jury's
refusal to indict Lord Shaftesbury on charges of treason as urged by
1. Note, The Grand Jury-Prosecutorial Abuse of the Indictment Process, 65 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 157 (1974); Note, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures, and Problems,
9 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 681 (1973); Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted
Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 (1965).
2. See Spain, The Grand Jury, Past and Present: A Survey, 2 Am. CRIM. L.Q.
119 (1964) (compilation of state statutes relating to the grand jury).
3. For Missouri law concerning the grand jury see §§ 540.010-.330, RSMo
1969, and in particular § 540.020, RSMo 1969 for the powers and duties of the
grand jury.
4. R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1634-1941, at 1 (1963).
5. Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM.
L. R. 701, 108-10 (1972). This author suggests that Henry II devised the grand
jury as a means of diverting court revenues from the judges to the crown.
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Charles 11.6 When the grand jury system began to operate in the
American colonies 7 it was thought of as a body which functioned with
some independence from the prosecution. There were thus two facets to
the grand jury. First, it was to investigate and determine whether cause
existed to bring an accused person to trial. Second, while performing the
first function, the grand jury was to stand between the individual and
the state to protect against "a mistaken, unjust, or over zealous prosecu-
tion, to prevent the anxiety and risk, the expense [and] the loss of repu-
tation ... which would result to an innocent person from an ill-founded
charge." 
8
In a consideration of the indicting grand jury it must be understood
that this body is not adjudicative but is an investigative body whose pur-
pose is to uncover and pursue all leads.9 This emphasis upon the inves-
tigative function has led to the uniform denial of the right of a grand
jury witness to observe the proceedings,1 0 to know the specific charges
under investigation," to cross-examine witnesses,1 2 to testify or present
evidence in his favor,1" to raise the issue of a lack of grand jury jurisdic-
tion,1 4 or to set any limits on the investigation a grand jury may con-
duct. 15 As there is no adjudication at the grand jury level which could
prejudice a witness, there is thought to be no need for these rights, the
exercise of which might interfere with, disrupt, or delay the investigatory
function of the grand jury.
In view of this investigative purpose, the indicting grand jury has been
provided with broad investigative powers.' 6  It may consider and act
6. R. YOUNGER, supra note 4, at 2.
7. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury .. " U.S. Const.
amend V. The Missouri Constitution provides for a grand jury at Mo. CONST.
art. I, § 16.
8. Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1338 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 947 (1976). See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). It is thought that the
grand jury was to operate as a "shield" between the state and the accused.
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87
(1972).
9. United States v. Doulin, 538 F.2d 466 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895
(1976).
10. United States ex. rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 790 (1944).
11. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65 (1906).
12. United States v. Schuly, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897
(1955); Boehm v. United States, 123 F.2d 791, 806 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
315 U.S. 800 (1942).
13. United States v. Bladgett, 30 F. Cas. 1157, 1158 (S.D. Ga. 1867) (No. 18,
312).
14. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1919).
15. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974).
16. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13 (1972), citing Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972).
1978]
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upon tips, rumors, evidence offered by the prosecution, and the jurors'
own personal knowledge.1 7  It has even been said that the purpose of
the grand jury is not complete "until every available clue has been run
down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime
has been committed." 18
One of these investigative powers is the power to subpoena witnesses
who can be compelled to testify or produce documents. The Supreme
Court of the United States has stated that the authority of the grand
jury to subpoena a witness is "not only historic, but essential to its
task."19 In accord with this, the subpoena power of the grand jury has
frequently been enforced with the courts' power of contempt.20 In the
event testimony may be self-incriminating and fall within a constitutional
protection, a witness may be granted immunity and compelled to testify
upon matters otherwise privileged. 21 This power to compel testimony is
premised in the belief that it is the absolute duty of a witness before the
grand jury to answer all questions, "subject only to a valid Fifth
Amendment claim or other limited privileges." 2 2  Courts have held to
the principle that the public has a right to any person's evidence; 2 3 this
provides the basis for much of the investigative power of the grand jury.
A witness summoned before the grand jury can raise very few objec-
tions,24 a feature of the grand jury system that appeals to prosecutors.
Because of its investigative rather than adjudicative purpose, the in-
dicting grand jury is not bound by those procedural and evidentiary
rules governing the conduct of criminal trials. 25 An indictment cannot
17. Id. at 15.
18. Id. at 13.
19. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
20. Id.; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273 (1919); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). See §§ 540.190-.210
RSMo (1969) (court enforcement of a witness' duty to testify).
21. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
22. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976).
23. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); citing Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972). This principle was "considered an 'indubitible cer-
tainty' that '[could not] be denied' by 1742." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 443 (1972). In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353 (1974), the
Court stated:
Ordinarily, of course, a witness has no right of privacy before the
grand jury. Absent some recognized privilege of confidentiality, every
man owes his testimony. He may invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but he may not decline
to answer on the grounds that his responses might prove embarrassing
or result in an unwelcome disclosure of his personal affairs.
24. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974); Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
25. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
[Vol. 43
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be challenged as based upon inadequate evidence; 26 evidence inadmissi-
ble at trial may be considered by the grand jury.27 For example, hear-
say evidence may not only be considered by the grand jury, it may be
the primary basis of an indictment. 28 Evidence that would normally be
excluded at trial as having been obtained from an illegal search and sei-
zure also may be brought before the grand jury,2 9 as can "information
obtained in violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination." 30 The Supreme Court summarized the ability of
the grand jury to consider all evidence brought before it when it stated:
Normally, there is no limitation on the character of evidence
that may be presented to a grand jury, which is enforceable by
an individual. The general rule . . . is that a defendant is not
entitled to have his indictment dismissed before trial simply be-
cause the Government acquire[d] incriminating evidence in vio-
lation of the law, even if the tainted evidence was presented to
the grand jury.31
Although the grand jury can consider incompetent evidence, the ques-
tion arises as to the extent to which an indictment based upon such evi-
dence may justify the subsequent arrest or search of an individual. As to
a search of the individual, it has been stated that the indicted person
should be able to raise the illegality of the source of knowledge (the
incompetent evidence) and "suppress the evidence and its fruits if they
were sought to be used against him at trial." 32 It appears that an in-
dictment may be the basis for an arrest warrant since the grand jury's
determination that probable cause existed for the indictment also estab-
lishes that element for the lawful arrest of the person so charged, not-
26. Id. at 345, citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) and
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
27. Although in many jurisdictions the grand jury may consider evidence
that would be incompetent at trial, some jurisdictions do not allow this practice.
See N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 249 (McKinney 1958), which states that the grand
jury can receive none but legal evidence. See also In re Investigation into Alleged
Commission of Criminal Abortions in the County of Kings, 286 App. Div. 270,
143 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1955); People v. Sexton, 187 N.Y. 495, 80 N.E. 396 (1907).
It has been held that if the prosecutor becomes aware of perjured testimony
which came before the grand jury, due process requires that he so notify the
grand jury and the court to correct any injustice. United States v. Guillette, 547
F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974).
28. United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270, 1274 (1st Cir. 1972), citing Costello
v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
29. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441 (1972).
30. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974), citing Lawn v.
United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
31. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 60 (1972), citing United States v.
Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 359 (1956).
32. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966).
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withstanding the presentation of incompetent evidence before the grand
jury.33
The grand jury has the power to compel the production of and to
consider evidence that would be inadmissible in a criminal trial. For
these reasons, the prosecutor may believe that his chances are more
favorable to obtain a grand jury indictment than to pass muster at a
preliminary hearing 34 where evidentiary rules apply and the accused is
allowed the assistance of counsel.3 5  Presently the grand jury depends
upon the prosecutor to select and secure the attendance of witnesses, to
question the witnesses, to instruct jury members as to laws alleged to
have been violated, 36 to perform much of the investigative work,3 7 and
to draw up the indictment.
Perhaps the most significant impact of the relationship between the
prosecution and the grand jury is the way it has altered the historical
two-fold purpose of the grand jury. Although the grand jury still fulfills
the investigative function, it is difficult to characterize the grand jury as
standing between the individual and the prosecutor on whom the grand
jury is so dependent. The problem lies in the fact that even though the
historical purpose of the grand jury was to guard the individual's liberty,
at present the grand jury "must, paradoxically, look to the very person
whose misconduct they are supposed to guard against for guidance as to
33. Giordenello v. United States,. 357 U.S. 480, 487 (1958); Ex parte United
States, 287 U.S. 241, 249 (1932); See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, CRIMINAL § 151 (1969). For the authorization" of the issuance of an arrest
warraht upon the basis of an indictment see FED. R. CRIM. P. 9; Mo. R. CRIM,. P.
24.19.
34. See Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 ArMi. CRIM. L. R.
807 (1972). In Missouri a preliminary hearing is necessary if the prosecution is
based upon an information, unless such hearing is waived by the accused or the
information was in substitution of the indictment. Mo. R. CRIM1. P. 23.02.
35. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Dash, supra note 34, at
814-15, suggested the following hypothetical statement by a prosecutor to a wit-
ness before the grand jury:
Yes, indeed, if you have a preliminary hearing, it is a critical stage of
the prosecution and you are entitled to counsel. You will be able to
cross-examine witnesses against you, present any testimony you wish to
give, challenge whether probable cause has been established and obtain
some discovery of the case against you-but, of course, that is if I
permit you to have a preliminary hearing. If I choose to go directly to
the grand jury, on the other hand, all these precious rights I just out-
lined for you are not available since you are not exposed to a critical
stage of the prosecution but only to the grand jury which indicts you.
36. Note, The Grand Jury-Prosecutorial Abuse of the Indictment Process, 65 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 157, 160 (1974).
37. Note, American Grand Jury: Investigatory and Indictment Powers, 22 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 136, 154 (1973). For the ability of a prosecuting attorney to act before
the grand jury in Missouri, see §§ 540.130-.140, RSMo 1969.
718 [Vol. 43
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when he is acting oppressively." 38  In light of the powers available to
the grand jury, the significant relationship between the grand jury and
the prosecution, and the lack of objections available to a witness appear-
ing before the grand jury, it is not surprising that the grand jury process
has been described as "a full fledged deposition procedure for the pros-
ecution." 39
A comparison of the rights and constitutional provisions which nor-
mally apply to witnesses at trial with the limited rights available to a
witness before the grand jury makes it clear that the grand jury has not
fulfilled one of its historical functions-that of standing between the in-
dividual and the prosecuting state.
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
One of the more significant rights denied witnesses appearing before
the grand jury is the right to counsel. The sixth amendment to the Con-
stitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 40 It
has been held that because a grand jury proceeding is not adversary or
adjudicatory in nature, 41 it is not a criminal proceeding and the sixth
amendment does not apply to a grand jury witness. 4 2 This longstanding
principle might have been compatible with a grand jury independent of
the prosecution. However, the denial of counsel is not consistent with
the goal of protecting the individual from ill-founded indictments, given
the nature of the relationship between the prosecution and the grand
jury.
In Coleman v. Alabama 4 3 the Supreme Court ruled that the sixth
amendment's right to counsel necessitated the presence of counsel to
represent the defendant at a preliminary hearing. 44 The court reasoned
that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage of the criminal process.
38. Antell, supra note 1, at 154.
39. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Proce-
dure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1191 (1960). A similar idea was expressed by the state-
ment that the grand jury is being reduced to "simply another investigative device
of law enforcement officials." United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 47 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
40. See also Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(a).
41. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
42. Id.; In re Groban's Petition, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). In United States v.
Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1955), the court said: "Such a body is not
charged with the duty of deciding innocence or guilt and, for this reason, its
proceedings have never been conducted with the assiduous regard for the pres-
ervation of procedural safeguards which normally attends the ultimate trial of
the issues."
43. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
44. Id. at 11. The purpose of the preliminary hearing in Alabama was to
determine whether a crime had been committed and whether there was probable
cause to bring the accused to trial. This is the same as the grand jury's function.
1978] 719
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The assistance of counsel was needed to "expose fatal weaknesses in the
State's case, . . . fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-
examination of State's witnesses at the trial, ... preserve testimony
favorable to the accused, ... discover the case the State has against his
client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense... ." ,,4
Additionally, counsel was thought essential to protect the accused against
an improper or ill-founded prosecution. 46
The "critical stage" standard47 would seem equally applicable to the
grand jury because that body has the power to charge an accused with
an offense for which he will have to stand trial. Considering the powers
available to the grand jury, that proceeding could be thought of as even
more critical a stage than the preliminary hearing. 48 Presently the
grand jury has the potential to be used as a deposition procedure for the
prosecution "without the embarrassing presence of the defendant or his
counsel." 49 Although an indicted individual may be allowed some dis-
covery of the grand jury proceedings, this discovery often is limited to
the evidence or testimony of witnesses before the grand jury that the
state will introduce or call a trial.5 0  Using the grand jury subpoena
power, the prosecution is able to gain otherwise difficult to obtain or
unavailable information helpful to the state's case but which would not
be used at trial. In this event, information strengthening the state's case
might not be discoverable by the defendant. The Coleman rationale
would appear to be applicable to such a situation because the interests of
the indicted individual, which were recognized as significant in the con-
text of a preliminary hearing, would be prejudiced due to his inability to
discover the information.
45. Id. at 9.
46. Id.
47. "The determination whether the hearing is a 'critical stage' requiring the
provision of counsel depends, as noted, upon an analysis 'whether potential sub-
stantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the ... confrontation and the
ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.'" Id. at 9, citing United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
48. If the current mode of constitutional analysis subscribed to by this
Court in recent cases requires that counsel be.present at preliminary
hearings, how can this be reconciled with the fact that the Constitu-
tion itself does not permit the assistance of counsel at the decidedly
more "critical" grand jury inquiry?
Id. at 25 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). It must be pointed out that the constitution
does not deny the assistance of counsel at grand jury hearings. See Dash, supra
note 34, at 813.
49. Goldstein, supra note 39, at 1191.
50. Missouri allows a defendant to discover: "Those portions of any existing
transcript of grand jury proceedings which relate to the offense with which de-
fendant is charged, containing testimony of the defendant and testimony of per-
sons whom the state intends to call as witnesses at a hearing or trial. . ... " Mo. R.
CRIM. P. 25.32(3). But see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The general policy of strict secrecy surrounding
720 (Vol. 43
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It could be argued that a preliminary hearing is more critical because
the investigation has already focused upon a certain person. However,
an indicting grand jury is also generally concerned with the activities of a
particular individual and, in this sense, has begun to focus upon that
person. As both procedures operate to determine whether there is prob-
able cause for an individual to stand trial, the Coleman standard of sub-
stantial prejudice, satisfied when applied to a preliminary hearing, would
seem to be equally satisfied when applied to the indicting grand jury.
Testimony before the grand jury may be used at a subsequent trial as
an admission or to impeach. It also may be used for leads to other evi-
dence.5 1  For these reasons a witness may be significantly prejudiced by
the absence of counsel to advise him of his rights at the grand jury pro-
ceedings. Even though a witness may rely on the fifth amendment to
avoid answering incriminating questions, he often lacks the training and
skill necessary to assert his constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. As the witness "may not be aware of the precise scope, the
nuances, and boundaries of his Fifth Amendment privilege," 5 2 he may
risk contempt by claiming the privilege prematurely or he might waive
his privilege by invoking it too late. The witness appearing without coun-
sel also runs the risk of alienating the grand jury by improperly and too
frequently asserting his privilege, or falling victim to a skilled prosecutor
by responding with incriminating information or waiving his
privilegd. 53 The presence of counsel would enable the witness to take
grand jury investigations accounts for the limited availability of discovery. For a
discussion of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings and its effects, see
Note, Grand Jury: Bulwark of Prosecutorial Immunity?, 3 Loy. CH L.J. 305 (1972),
in which the author suggests that secrecy is thought necessary to prevent the
escape of those whose indictment is contemplated, to ensure freedom to the
grand jury in its deliberations and prevent persons subject to indictment or their
friends from influencing the grand jurors, to prevent subornation of perjury or
tampering with grand jury witnesses, to encourage disclosures by persons with
information concerning the commission of crimes, and to protect the innocent
accused who is exonerated.
51. See Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United
States v. H.J.K. Theatres, 236 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. Kloch,
210 F.2d 215 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954). See also Mesbesher,
Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189, 202 (1966); Note, The Rights
of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DUKE L.J. 97.
52. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 604 (1976) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting), citing Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
53. See Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also
Mesbesher, supra note 51, at 190, where the author reflects upon the coercive
atmosphere by stating:
A potential defendant who is brought before the grand jury without
an attorney at his side is almost helpless. He is faced with a barrage of
questions, often improper in the normal judicial setting, thrown at him
by a group of reasonably intelligent citizens excited at the prospect of
playing both lawyer and detective. This torrent of interrogation is, of
1978]
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss4/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
full advantage of his constitutional privileges 5 4 and would avoid the
delay and antagonization of jurors which might result from the witness
leaving the chambers to talk with his attorney prior to answering each
question. 5
5
The presence of the witness' counsel is also necessary to offset poten-
tial abuse of the grand jury by the prosecution. As the grand jury is
composed of laymen, the prosecutor is placed in the position of explain-
ing legal principles while conducting much of the proceeding. This com-
bination of factors gives the prosecutor considerable influence over the
grand jury, with a potential result of unjustified indictment. 56 Addi-
tionally, it has been suggested that the secrecy which surrounds grand
jury proceedings facilitates prosecutorial abuse of grand jury powers.57
The presence of the witness' counsel might help control excesses and
mitigate undue influence.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE SUBPOENA
POWER, AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. The Subpoena Power 58
As mentioned earlier, the subpoena power is one of the most impor-
tant powers available to the grand jury.59  It is through the subpoena
course, directed by a skilled prosecutor capable of utilizing the grandjury as a tool to obtain incriminating evidence from the mouth of a
nervous witness.
54. "Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the
right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-
incrimination." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
55. For cases sanctioning the right of a witness to consult his attorney outside
the grand jury chambers during questioning, see In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806
(5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 958 (1969); United States v. De Sapio, 299 F. Supp. 436
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999
(1971).
56. See Note, The Grand Jury -Prosecutorial Abuse of the Indictment Process, 65
J. CRIm. L. & C. at 160.
57. "Although the grand jury is exalted as a curb upon the arbitrary use of
power, ironically, it encourages abuses by allowing the prosecuting authority to
carry on its work with complete anonymity and with effects greatly magnified by
the accompanying judicial rites." Antell, supra note 1, at 156. A recent study
"disclosed that prosecutors often disclose to the grand jury the prior criminal
records of the accused, or introduce as part of their probable cause case illegally
obtained confessions which would not be admissible at trial." Dash, supra note 34,
at 816, citing, Schmentz, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Field Summary of Eviden-
tiary Practices, March, 1972 (unpublished manuscript in Georgetown University
Law Center, Washington D.C.).
58. The subpoena power is discussed with the fourth amendment because
the propriety of a subpoena is tested under fourth amendment analysis.
59. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
722 [Vol. 43
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that reluctant witnesses can be compelled to appear and bring papers or
documents before the grand jury. The subpoena can not be enforced by
the grand jury; it is enforced by the court in whose jurisdiction the
grand jury is located. 60 Thus, if a witness believes that a subpoena vio-
lates his constitutional rights, he may bring a motion to quash before the
court in order to challenge the subpoena. 61
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the "grand jury's
subpoena power is not unlimited. It may consider incompetent evidence,
but it may not itself violate a valid privilege, whether established by the
Constitution, statutes or the common law." 62 In accordance with this
statement it has been held that the grand jury cannot subpoena or com-
pel testimony regarding such privileged communications as those be-
tween husband and wife,6 3 attorney and client,6 4 doctor and patient, 6 or
priest and penitant.66 The manner in which subpoenaed information
was discovered also may provide grounds for a motion to quash. By fed-
eral statute no evidence may come before any grand jury which was dis-
covered directly or indirectly as a result of the illegal interception of an
oral or wire communication.
6 7
60. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 12 (1972); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
61. See United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); In re Verplank,
329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971). Another means to challenge the authority of
the grand jury to compel an answer is for the witness to refuse to respond. In
this instance the witness would be subject to a contempt citation, but only after a
court determined that the requested information was not privileged or protected.
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951). Missouri provides for such judicial
determination in §§ 540.190-.210, RSMo 1969.
62. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974). The Court
suggested that the grand jury may not force a witness to answer questions in
violation of the fifth amendment privilege or compel a person to produce books
and papers that would incriminate him. The grand jury is also without power to
invade a legitimate privacy interest protected by the fourth amendment. See text
accompanying notes 63-66 infra.
Missouri has by statute, § 540.160, RSMo 1969, provided that after an in-
dictment a person who has been or is expected to be a witness for the indicted
individual may not be subpoenaed.
63. Blau v. United Staes, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
64. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); In re Goldman,
331 F. Supp. 509 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
65. In re Investigation into Alleged Commission of Criminal Abortions in the
County of Kings, 286 App. Div. 270, 143 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1955).
66. In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1968) provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no
part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any ... proceeding in or
before any ... grand jury ... or other authority of the United States,
a State, or a political subdivision thereof. ...
7231978]
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The anticipated use of subpoenaed information or testimony also may
be challenged as improper and provide grounds to quash a subpoena.
There are broad statements to the effect that it is an abuse to use the
subpoena power as a mere discovery device. 8 It has been held that a
subpoena may be challenged where information is sought "to obtain evi-
dence for use in [an ongoing] criminal prosecution," 6 9 or for the pri-
mary or exclusive purpose of preparing a pending indictment for trial.
70
Likewise, a subpoena or a subsequent indictment may be quashed if a
prosecutor calls before the grand jury an already indicted defendant and
questions him concerning the subject matter of that crime for which he
stands formally charged.71 A motion to quash also might be based on
the ground that the subpoena is unreasonably broad or sweeping,7 2 that
it seeks irrelevant material, 73 or that it appears to have been issued in
bad faith or with intent to harass.
7 4
As a practical matter it is difficult to establish the grounds to support a
motion to quash a subpoena. One of the major problems is that the
witness has a right to know only the names of the persons investigated,
not the charges. 75 More significantly, the purpose or scope of a grand
jury proceeding is often "at the outset ... only hazily perceived and ten-
tatively defined," 76 making it difficult to establish that use of the sub-
poena is abusive or unreasonable.
B. Applicability of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides for "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
That the statute is applicable to state proceedings is shown in Lee v. Florida, 392
U.S. 378 (1968). See also State v. Farha, 218 Kan. 394, 544 P.2d 341 (1975),
People v. Sher, 38 N.Y.2d 600, 345 N.E.2d 314 (1976).
68. Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972).
69. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
70. United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270 (1st Cir. 1972).
71. In United States v. Doss, 545 F.2d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1977), the court
stated:
When a person under our system of law has been indicted for a crime
[or is the subject of an information], the government has no more
right to call him before a grand jury and question him about that
crime than it has .to call an unwilling defendant to the stand during
trial of the case.
72. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
73. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 425 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
74. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 (1972); United States v. Mara,
410 U.S. 19, 47 (1972); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1080 (9th Cir.
1972), cited in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973).
75. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65 (1906).
76. United States v. Doulin, 538 F.2d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 1976), citing Blair v.
United States, 210 U.S. 273 (1919).
724 [Vol. 43
11
Heitz: Heitz: Rights of a Witness before the Grand Jury
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
GRAND JURY WITNESS RIGHTS
searches and seizures." In Hale v. Henkel 77 the Supreme Court expressly
applied a "test of reasonableness" and held that a subpoena was so broad
and sweeping as to be unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
7 8
The 1906 decision concerned a subpoena duces tecum which required
the production of all correspondence, contracts, understandings, reports,
and accounts between the petitioner's company and six other companies,
along with all letters received by petitioner's company from more than a
dozen other companies. However, in United States v. Dionisio 79 the Court
said that the fourth amendment did not apply to a subpoena directing a
group of twenty persons to produce voice exemplars. The Seventh Cir-
cuit had ruled that the grand jury could not subpoena the exemplars
absent a prior showing of the reasonableness of the seizure.80 In rever-
sing the lower court the Supreme Court stated that "a grand jury sub-
poena to testify is not that kind of a governmental intrusion on privacy
against which the Fourth Amendment affords protection, once the Fifth
Amendment is satisfied," 81 that "it is not a 'seizure' in the Fourth
Amendment sense."8 2 In contrast to the expectation of privacy sur-
rounding an individual's personal papers, the Court stated that no per-
son can have a justifiable expectation of immunity from a grand jury
subpoena, 83 because it is the obligation of each citizen to appear before
the grand jury and give his evidence. 84 Additionally, the Court
reasoned that requiring a preliminary hearing to determine the reason-
ableness of a subpoena would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and
severely handicap the grand jury's investigative function. 85
The dissenting justices indicated that even though judicial controls and
motions to quash might to some degree control excesses of the grand
jury, it was ill-advised to assert that a grand jury's use of the subpoena in
this instance did not constitute a seizure. An independent grand jury
could be "relied upon to prevent unwarranted interference with the lives
of private persons and to ensure that the ... subpoena powers ... are
exercised in only a reasonable fashion." 86 On the other hand, with the
increased reliance of the grand jury upon the prosecutor, a holding that
the fourth amendment was not applicable opened the door to potential
abuse of the grand jury's powers and "the dangers of excessive and un-
reasonable interference with personal liberty ... the Fourth Amendment
77. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
78. Id. at 76.
79. 410 U.S. 1 (1972).
80. 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 1 (1972).
81. 410 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
82. Id. at 9.
83. Id. at 12 n.11.
84. Id. at 9-10.
85. Id. at 17.
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was intended to prevent." 87 The minority believed that Dionisio would
allow the grand jury-with "guidance" from the prosecutor-to use
subpoena power to obtain such voice exemplars in circumstances in
which, according to Davis v. Mississippi, 88 law enforcement officials would
be violating the fourth amendment if they were to compel the same
exemplars.8 9  In determining whether official action constitutes a sei-
zure, the minority saw no ground to distinguish between acts by a grand
jury and acts by the police. It would seem that the Dionisio decision fo-
cused upon only the investigative function of the grand jury and ignored
both its historical function as a barrier between the individual and the
state and its present day reliance on the prosecutor with the accompany-
ing danger of abuse.90
The Court found in Dionisio that a requirement of a preliminary show-
ing of reasonableness for the issuance of a subpoena would cause ex-
treme delay and disruption to the grand jury investigative process.9 1 It
would seem, however, that when the issuance of a subpoena has been
questioned by a motion to quash, the government should be required to
make some minimal showing as to the propriety of the subpoena. Along
these lines and subsequent to Dionisio, several jurisdictions have held that
although the grand jury need not show probable cause to enforce a sub-
poena, the government should establish the grand jury's jurisdiction in
the matter, that the subject matter subpoenaed is relevant to the investi-
gation, and that the material is not sought for a purpose unrelated to
the investigation. 92 Such a minimal requirement gives deference to the
traditional investigative function of the grand jury yet recognizes the fact
87. Id.
88. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
89. The majority distinguished Davis by stating that a grand jury subpoena
involves no stigma and is under the control and supervision of a court. In con-
trast to a seizure effectuated by an arrest or an investigative stop, the compulsion
exerted by a grand jury subpoena is merely that of a "civil obligation." 410 U.S.
1, 10 (1972).
90. Justice Marshall's dissent suggested that the decision could encourage
prosecutorial exploitation of the grand jury process and bring the institution
closer to becoming simply another investigative device of law enforcement offi-
cials. What law enforcement officers could not accomplish directly themselves
they may now accomplish indirectly through the grand jury. United States v.
Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 45 (1972). Justice Douglas in his dissent interpreted the deci-
sion as "allow[ing] the prosecutor to do under the cloak of the grand jury what
he could not do on his own." Id. at 31.
91. Id. at 17.
92. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 425 F. Supp. 717, 718 (S.D. Fla.
1977); United States v. Grand Jury Investigation, 417 F. Supp. 389, 391 (E.D.
Pa. 1976), citing In the Matter of Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 529
F.2d 543, 548 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 93-94 (3d Cir. 1973).
726 [Vol. 43
13
Heitz: Heitz: Rights of a Witness before the Grand Jury
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
GRAND JURY WITNESS RIGHTS
that the modern grand jury powers are susceptible to prosecutorial
abuse.
93
C. The Exclusionary Rule
Following Dionisio, the Supreme Court further restricted the fourth
amendment protection of a witness facing the grand jury by holding that
the exclusionary rule was not applicable in grand jury proceedings. In
United States v. Calandra, 94 the grand jury obtained a document that fed-
eral agents had illegally seized from Calandra's files. Calandra instituted
a motion to suppress the illegally seized evidence which the grand jury
was planning to use as the basis for its questioning of the subpoenaed
witness. Refusing to apply the exclusionary rule, the Court held that a
grand jury witness could not refuse to answer questions on the ground
that they were based on illegally seized evidence. The Court reasoned
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter illegal activities by
law enforcement personnel and not to redress injury to an individual's
privacy.9 5 In addition, use of illegally obtained evidence by the grand
jury as the basis for questioning an individual was thought to be only a
"derivative use" of the evidence and did not constitute a "new Fourth
Amendment wrong." 96 The questions originating from the tainted evi-
dence "involved no independent government invasion of one's person,
house, papers, or effects, but rather the usual abridgment of personal
privacy common to all grand jury questioning." 97 The Court also stated
that application of the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings
would seriously interfere with its investigative functions which histori-
cally were not restricted by the rules of evidence and procedure applica-
ble to criminal trials.9 8 Finally, the majority suggested that the
exclusionary rule was not constitutionally mandated but was a judicially
created doctrine.9 9 When the above mentioned factors were considered
together, it was determined that the minimal deterrent effect would not
93. "It seems that such a minimal requirement is almost indispensible if citi-
zens are to be afforded minimum protections against the possible arbitrary exer-
cise of power by a prosecutor through the use of the grand jury machinery." In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 425 F. Supp. 717, 718 (S.D. Fla. 1977), citing In re
Grand Jury Proceeding, 486 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1973).
94. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
95. Id. at 347.
96. Id. at 354.
97. Id.
98. The Court said that application of the exclusionary rule would "delay
and disrupt grand jury proceedings, ... halt the orderly progress of an investi-
gation and might necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially re-
lated to the grand jury's primary objective, ... [and] unduly interfere with the
effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury's duties." Id. at 349-50.
99. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
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balance the harm which would result from applying the exclusionary
rule to grand jury proceedings.10 0
The Court in Calandra seems to have interpreted and applied the
exclusionary rule in a much narrower fashion than earlier Supreme
Court decisions would suggest. Calandra focused upon deterrence as the
primary purpose for the exclusionary rule; other decisions have stressed
that the rule is necessary "to maintain inviolate large areas of personal
privacy."101  Calandra sanctioned mere derivative use of illegally ob-
tained evidence by the grand jury. It had earlier been stated by the
Court that "the essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evi-
dence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all." 1 02
It appears that, upon being subpoenaed by the grand jury, a witness
may challenge an order to compel the production of documents on the
ground that the subpoena is too broad, as in Hale v. Henkel. Under
Dionisio it is much more difficult for the witness to challenge a subpoena
ordering the witness himself to appear and provide the grand jury with
physical evidence such as a voice exemplar.10 3 It is ironic that the grand
jury could obtain the appearance of the person with fewer objections
available to the witness than if only his papers had been subpoenaed.
The grand jury also may use evidence illegally seized by law enforce-
ment officials without its being subject to the exclusionary rule. 10 4 In
view of the relationship of the grand jury and the prosecutor, the deci-
sions in Calandra and Dionisio, while reaffirming the function of the
grand jury as an investigative body, have had the practical effect of mak-
ing the grand jury a more inviting tool for law enforcement officials 105
and increasing the potential for prosecutorial abuse.
100. See West v. United States, 359 F.2d 50, 56 (8th Cir. 1966).
101. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961), citing Feldman v. United States,
322 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1944).
102. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). The
exclusionary rule has been referred to as "that command which this Court has
held to be a clear, specific and constitutionally-even if judicially implied-
deterrent safeguard." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1962). "[Wjhen the
Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is consid-
ered with the Fifth Amendment's law against compelled self-incrimination, a
constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually requires the
exclusionary rule." Id. at 662 (Black, J. concurring). See also Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
103. There is a question how far a grand jury could go in subpoenaing evi-
dence without having to establish the reasonableness of the subpoena. Arguably
Dionisio would apply to evidence such as handwriting or hair samples, and possi-
bly blood samples. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1972), applied the same
principles as in Dionisio in upholding a subpoena of handwriting samples.
104. See notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra.
105. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 47 (1972) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
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III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall ... be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 108 De-
cisions have held that both the due process clause and the right against
self-incrimination apply to grand jury proceedings. The due process
clause is violated, when a grand jury indictment rests upon information
which the prosecutor knew was perjured. 07 An unreasonable delay in
the seeking of an indictment may also breach due process standards. An
indictment should be dismissed if pre-indictment delay results in sub-
stantial prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial and if the delay
was employed by the government in an effort to gain a "tactical advan-
tage" over the accused, but this test is rigorously applied in finding a
violation of due process.1
08
It is the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination that is
most often associated with a witness appearing before the grand jury.
This privilege provides one of the few exceptions to the broad investiga-
tive powers of the grand jury,10 9 and is a bulwark against abuse of those
powers. 110 The fifth amendment protects a witness from being com-
pelled to incriminate himself, and the scope of the privilege is "as broad
as the mischief against which it seeks to guard." 11
When asserting his fifth amendment privilege before the grand jury, a
witness without counsel must struggle with the technical rules which sur-
round a claim of privilege.11 2 The privilege is personal and therefore
cannot be asserted to protect others. 1 3 The privilege can only be as-
106. A similar provision is found at Mo. CONST. art. I, § 19.
107. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974). See note 27
supra.
108. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971); United States v.
Roberts, 548 F.2d 665 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657
(6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Croucher, 532 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Alderman, 423 F. Supp. 847 (D. Md. 1976) (Summarization of
federal jurisdictions). Jurisdictions appear to be split as to whether the test is
single or dualpronged. Some courts have held that substantial prejudice to the
defendant is sufficient to constitute a violation of due process; others have re-
quired both substantial prejudice and a finding that delay was intentionally
employed by the government to support a finding of a violation of due process
standards.
109. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'r, 378 U.S. 94 (1964).
110. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 604 (1976) (Brennan, J. dis-
senting).
111. Id. at 574, citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
112. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.'
113. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1960); Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367, 371 (1951); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
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serted to prevent the elicitation of incriminating information, not merely
private or embarrassing information.'1 4 Just as there are restrictions on
asserting the privilege, there are also technical rules regarding waiver of
the fifth amendment privilege. A witness can waive his privilege against
self-incrimination by disclosing an incriminating fact. Once this has been
done, disclosure of the details surrounding this fact are no longer
privileged."-'
Even if a witness successfully asserts his privilege and avoids waiver,
the government may overcome the privilege by granting immunity to the
witness. "Immunity is the Government's ultimate tool for securing tes-
timony that otherwise would be protected," 116 and once immunity has
been granted the reason behind the privilege theoretically disap-
pears. 1 7 A question did exist whether the immunity granted should be
"use" or "transactional" immunity, 118 but a recent federal statute1 19 pro-
viding for the granting of only use immunity was upheld by the Su-
preme Court in Kastigar v. United States.
120
The importance of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination was recognized by the Supreme Court in Miranda v.
Arizona,12 1 and a rule was developed in that case for advising a person of
his privilege prior to interrogation. The Court reasoned that "without
the protections flowing from adequate warnings ... all the safeguards
erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any
other witness, would become empty formalities." 122 Advising a witness
of the availability of his privilege was thought necessary to warn the per-
son that he was encountering an aspect of the criminal justice system
where adverse consequences could result from his testimony.
123
114. Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365-66 (1917). See note 23 supra.
115. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373-374 (1951). "[I]f the wit-
ness himself elects to waive his privilege ... and discloses his criminal connec-
tions, he is not permitted to stop, but must go on and make a full disclosure."
Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 314 (1912).
116. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976).
117. "Immunity displaces the danger." Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,
439 (1956).
118. See Rief, The Grand Jury Witness and Compulsory Testimony Legislation, 10
AM. CRIM. L.J. 829 (1972).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
120. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
121. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488
(1964), in which the Court stated: "We have also learned the companion lesson
of history that no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continual effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through una-
wareness of their constitutional rights."
122. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
123. This warning is needed in order to make him (the witness) aware
not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it.
... Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more
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It has been argued that the same principles apply to a witness appear-
ing before the grand jury, but the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Mandujano 124 that the Miranda warnings need not be given to a putative
defendant appearing as a witness before the grand jury.1 25 The Court
reasoned that grand jury proceedings were clearly distinguishable from
the police interrogations before the Court in Miranda.1 26  The Court
recognized the broad investigative powers of the grand jury,1 27 but
stated that "in contrast to the police-it is not likely that [the grand jury]
will abuse those powers." 128
The assertion that the grand jury is not likely to abuse its powers is
subject to question, particularly in view of the relationship between the
grand jury and the prosecution and the fact that the prosecutor often
questions the witness. Although prior Supreme Court decisions had
placed great importance upon the exercise of constitutional rights ac-
corded a witness involved in the criminal process, the Court has balked
at applying these constitutional standards in grand jury proceedings.
These recent decisions have apparently been based upon the concept of
a grand jury independent of the prosecutor-a grand jury that does not
exist today. When a witness comes before a body whose interests are
adverse to his own, where his statements may be subsequently used
against him at trial, where he may be forced to respond to questions
which are based upon illegally seized evidence, where he is without the
guiding hand of counsel, and where skilled prosecutors whose primary
interest is in obtaining criminal convictions are leading the interrogation,
a witness is not appearing before an independent body of laymen who
stand between the witness and the state. As broad powers exist in the
grand jury, the temptation to the prosecutor to abuse those powers is
significant. For these reasons the witness should at least be advised of his
privilege against self-incrimination-one of the few rights that he does
have before the grand jury.
acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary
system-that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his
interest.
Id. at 469.
124. 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
125. It has been suggested that witnesses before the grand jury be classifed as
de jure, de facto, or potential defendants. See Note, Self Incrimination by Federal
Grand Jury Witnesses: Uniforn Protection Advocated, 67 YALE L.J. 1271 (1958); Note,
The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DuKE L.J. 97. See also 425 U.S. at
579 (Brennan, J., concurring).
126. 425 U.S. at 578-79.
127. "Indispensible to the exercise of its power is the authority to compel the
attendance and the testimony of witnesses." Id. at 571.








Recent Supreme Court decisions have had the effect of increasing the
imbalance in historical grand jury functions. Originally the grand jury
was established to investigate activity and determine whether a crime had
been committed and identify the person who probably committed the
crime. At the same time, it was to stand as a barrier between the pros-
ecution and the individual. Both functions were relatively compatible
when the grand jury was an independent body with little reliance upon
the prosecutor. As the grand jury has come to rely increasingly upon the
prosecutor to conduct much of the actual investigation, gathering of evi-
dence, and interrogation of witnesses, there has been a corresponding
decrease in the independence of that body and its ability to stand be-
tween the individual and the prosecutor. It is against this background
that one must consider the recent Supreme Court decisions relating to
the rights of witnesses before the grand jury.
The Court's reassertion of the rule that a witness' counsel may not
appear before the grand jury with his client is most significant in light of
the relationship of the grand jury and the prosecution. Because the wit-
ness appears before the grand jury without a judge, counsel, or an im-
partial official to protect him, he must rely upon his own often in-
adequate skills to assert his privileges. In characterizing the results of
such a situation, Judge Learned Hand said that "save for torture, it
would be hard to find a more effective tool of tyranny than the power of
unlimited and unchecked ex parte examination there available." 12 9 The
presence of the witness' counsel would not only ensure the witness of the
full protection of his constitutional rights, but also might act to forestall
abuse of grand jury powers by the prosecution.
Restriction of the applicability of the fourth amendment to grand jury
proceedings has done much to increase the investigative power available
to the grand jury, to increase the potential and temptation for pros-
ecutorial abuse and simultaneously to lower the protection of individual
liberties. By not requiring a showing of probable cause prior to a grand
jury's subpoena of voice exemplars, the Court has given the grand jury
power that even law enforcement officials do not have. The refusal to
apply the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings creates the possi-
bility that a court may find the victim of an illegal search and seizure in
contempt for refusing "to participate in the exploitation of that conduct
in violation of the explicit command of the Fourth Amendment. ... " 130
Added to this is the fact that a person may be indicted solely on the basis
of evidence which is inadmissible at trial. This possibility conflicts with
129. United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 913 (1954) (L. Hand, J., dissenting).
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the traditional grand jury function of ensuring that one does not face
trial on ill-founded charges.
Just as the fourth amendment has been narrowed in its application to
grand jury proceedings, the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination has been directly and indirectly restricted. Sanctioning
"use" rather than "transactional" immunity has taken away the absolute
fifth amendment privilege and replaced it with a less than equivalent
substitute. The protection against self-incrimination has been indirectly
limited by the refusal to allow counsel to appear with the witness. This
forces the layman witness to assert the privilege on his own, possibly
resulting in a failure to take full advantage of the protection accorded
him under the fifth amendment.
The source of much criticism of the grand jury lies in the restriction
of constitutional rights and privileges of witnesses in the face of ex-
panded prosecutorial influence in the grand jury process. Kastigar,
Dionisio, Calandra, and Mandujano signify an increase in the investigative
powers of the grand jury through a restriction of the rights of individu-
als called before that body. In association with the increased prosecutor-
ial power in the grand jury proceedings, the recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have effectively transformed the grand jury-- historically the
safeguard of the layman witness-into a powerful tool against the wit-
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